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tions in favor of personal rights which are formulated in the
Constitution and its amendments, but those limitations
-would exist rather by inference and the general spirit of
the Constitution from which Congress derives all its powers
than by any express and direct application of its provisions."
By annexation then, the territory and the inhabitants become
-auintegral part of the United States, to be governed by the
people of the United States as expressed by Acts of Congress, Congress having power to pass all acts to regulate
the government of the territories, subject only to the
restriction that those acts must not be in conflict with the
-Constitution.
PHIr.ADur.PHIA, March, 1893.
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PERHAPS there is no branch of the law in which the

-courtshave allowed themselves greater latitude of expression
than that branch which is occupied with determining the
•effect of lapse of time upon the rights of plaintiffs who seek
for equitable relief. It is obvious that radically different
-considerations are applicable, on the one hand, to cases
in which a trust relation subsists between plaintifi and
-defendant, and, on the other hand, to cases in which
there is no such relation between the parties. Again,
in cases in which a trust relation does subsist, it is clear
that great importance must be attached to the distinction
between trusts which arise from the operation of law upon
.a written instrument or from the express or tacit admission
.of trusteeship by the defendant, and cases in which the
trust arises purely by construction of law and in consequence
,of facts and circumstances dehors the written instrument,
-and independent of any admission on the part of the defend-
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ant. But an examination of the cases shows that the
courts have shown themselves unusually ready to indulge
in universal propositions in deciding particular cases, and
they have not shrunk from asserting that mere lapse of time
will bar no trusts whatever, when they happened to be
deciding a case involving an express trust; and they have
alleged with equal positiveness, when it so happened that a
constructive trust was before them for examination, that in
all cases of trust the Statute of Limitations will be applied
by a chancellor at the expiration of the period limited by
the law.
The result of all this has been to create much confusion
upon a subject that is not of itself difficult to understand.
It is easy to trace the effect of this confusion upon the text
writers, who have in general failed to recognize what are
conceived to be the true principles applicable to the determination of these questions. Thus LEwiN, in his admirable
work on trusts, while explicitly distinguishing between
express and constructive trusts, and between cases in which
laches is, and those in which it is not, imputable to the
plaintiff, nevertheless fails to-observe the distinction in the
discussion of particular decisions. He cites Lord ALVANLEfS celebrated decision in Pickering v. Lord Stamford1 in
the course of which that distinguished jurist remarked: "I
know of no rule that has established tlat mere length of
time will bar." Then LEWIN adds: "The doctrine laid
down by Lord ALVANLEY in the case referred to, that mnere
length of time will not bar, requires some qualification." '
He proceeds to instance cases of suits against a trustee to.
impeach a purchase, suits to set aside the purchase of a
reversionary interest, suits to fix a defendant with a constructive trust, and suits asking relief for acts of waste or
on the ground of fraud. In such cases, he says, a delay ofless than twenty years may bar the plaintiffs' claim to relief.
It is clear that none of these cases requires a modification of
Lord ALVANLEY'S statement. They are none of them cases.
12 V sFY, Jr., 282.
2 *872.
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in which there is "a mere lengik of time." They are all of
them cases in which either the positive bar of the statute is
applied in obedience to the rule of laW, or in which that
branch of the doctrine of laches which proceeds upon the
ground of equitable estoppel is always applied by the
chancellor.
Nor is LEWIN'S three-fold classification of the cases in
which lapse of time will operate as a bar an entirely satisfactory classification. The three bars which he recognizes
are (i) a statute of limitation; (2) the presumption of something done, which, if done, is subversive of the plaintiff's
rights ; (3) the ground of public policy or inconvenience of
the relief.1 It is believed that an examination of the lucid
opinion of Lord ALVANLEY, in Pickering v. Lord Stamford, will make it clear that there should be a four-fold division-a division which will be found to harmonize the great
mass of ju.dicial decisions upon lapse of time, and .not inconsistent with any well-considered case. This classification
may be thus stated: The chancellor will deny equitable relief
to the plaintiff (I) if the defendant has held adversely to the
plaintiff for more than the legal statutory period; (2) if the
plaintiff, by acquiescence, has given his tacit consent to
acts which he now seeks to impeach; (3) if the case is one
in which, owing to the lapse of time, the Court will, according to certain definite principles, presume something to
have been done which, if done, would bar the suit; (4) if
during the delay of the plaintiff there has been a loss of
evidence, or by reason of the delay of the plaintiff the
defendant or third persons have altered their position for the
worse. In the first case the chancellor is said to act in
obedience to the statutes of limitation.2 In the second case
the chancellor proceeds upon the ground that a Court of
Equity will not permit a plaintiff to obtain relief against the
very transaction to which he was himself a party. In the
3*864.
2 ,, 1 think it is a mistake in point of language to say that Courts of
Equity act merely by analogy to the statutes; they act in obedience to
them." Lord PCDESDALE, in Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef., 63o.
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third case the chancellor refuses relief, not because he really
believes what is presumed, but, in the absence of evidence, for
the purpose of quieting the possession. "It
is said,".
remarks Lord IERSKINE, "you cannot firesume unless you
believe. It is because there are no means of creating belief
or disbelief that such general presumptions are raised."' In
the fourth case-to which, and to which alone, the term lachesis applicable-the chancellor is governed by the familiar
maxim '"Vigilantibus
non dormientibus aequitas subvenit."
He will not assist the plaintiff, if the hardship upon the
defendant is of the plaintiff's own making; in other words,
the plaintiff is e4tofed. If a case cannot be reduced to one
of these four categories no lapse of time, however long, will
bar the plaintiff of his relief. "The mere lapse of time,"
said Mr. Justice STORY in Oliver v. Piatt,2 "constitutes
of itself no bar to the enforcement of a subsisting trust."
Before examining each of these categories in detail, it
will be convenient to state the case of Pickering v. Lord
Stamford. A testator gave the residue of his personal
estate to a charity, and thirty-five years: after his death a
bill was filed by the representative of one of his next of kin,
praying that such part as consisted of money lent upon
mortgage or other real security might be declared a void
bequest under the statutes of mortmain which forbade testamentary gifts of interests in, and charges or encumbrances
upon, real estate. The bill further prayed a distribution
among the next of kin then living. Lord ALVANLEY
approached the case from the point of view of sound common sense. He expressed himself as anxious to discourage
stale claims, but he admitted that mere lapse of time would
not bar. "Therefore, that being the case, I am to say
whether, under the circumstances, a bar can be resumed."
Having directed inquiries by a master, he came to the conclusion that no release or assignment could be presumed.
Then he considered the case in the light of the doctrine of
laches, or, as he was pleased to. say, the ground of incon'Hillary v. Waller, 12 Vessey, 266.
23 How, 411.
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venience. "If from the plaintiff's lying by it is impossiblefor the defendants to render the accounts he calls for, or it.
will subject them to great inconvenience, he must suffer; or
the Court will oppose, what I think the best ground, heblicConvenience. The plaintiffs are so conscious of this that
they do not call on the trustees to account for what has
been -disbursed before any demand made. It appears that
the trustees, who by their conduct have done themselves.
great credit, have kept such accounts that there is no difficulty in finding the personal estate at the death of the testator. Therefore, not desiring to be understood to give any
countenance to these stale demands, but upon the circumstance that there is nothing inducing great public or privateinconvenience,'that the accounts are found, and that thetrustees are not called on to account for what has been dis-.
bursed, I am bound to decide in favor of the plaintiffs."
This should seem to be the proper attitude of mind in which
to approach such cases, and it is submitted that every word
of the opinion is sound law and good sense. Of course, thequestion of the bar of the statute did not arise, as the
defendants admitted their trusteeship; and no question ofacquiescence presented itself, as the plaintiff was not complaining of a breach of trust..
The four propositions enunciated above may now be
examined in order, and a few typical cases analyzed with a
view to justifying the classification.
I. It was asserted above that the Statute of Limitations
will never be applied in equity except in cases in which the
defendant's holding is adverse to the plaintiff's. If this
is true, it will follow that the statute will never bar a cestui'
que trust of his relief against a defendant who has been
constituted trustee (a) either as the result of the intention
of the parties expressed in a written instrument, or (b) as a
result of the operation of law upon a written instrument
independently of the intention of the parties, or (c) as a
result of the defendant's own admission, whether that admission is expressed in words or implied from conduct. In all
these cases an exfiress or actualtrust is said to exist; while to-
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the important class of trusts falling under b the specific
name resulting trust is applied. All trusts that are not
express (or, as it is sometimes called, actual) are constructive. And to constructive trusts the statute is always applied.
Lord CAIRNS, in Cunningham v. root,' defined an ex-

press trust to be "a trust which arises upon the construction of a written instrument." This, however, is too
narrow a definition. In Life Association v. Siddal' a
trustee devised his estate to one Grace Thompson, subject
to the payment of a legacy, so that the trust estate did not
pass. She, although not a trustee or legally representing
the trustee, assumed to act, and actually acted, as a trustee
under the will. In the exercise of her assumed po-wers she
committed a breach of trust: It was held that she was an
e.rfress trustee, and that therefore the Statute of Limitations was no protection to her. "If,"I said Lord Justice
TURNER, "she had by writing declared herself to be a
trustee the trust in her could not have been otherwise than
express, and her conduct is equivalent to her written
declaration." This case, it will be observed, is a direct
authority in support of proposition c. It would be better,
as foreshadowed above, to define an express trust as a trust
in which the trustee does not hold adversely to his cestui que

trust. This definition is broad enough to cover that class
of express trusts commonly called resulting trusts, since
'the trustee there admits his trusteeship, and holds with such
powers and for such persons as the law designates. The
fact that the identity of the real cestui que trust is a matter
of dispute ivill not cause the Statute of Limitations to run
in the trustee's favor. Thus, in Lister v. Pickford3 the
trustees of a landed estate under a will erroneously collected and paid over the rents of an adjoining piece of land
to the beneficial owners of the principal estate. Twentytwo years after the death of the testator the residuary
2

3 App. C., 984.
3 DeG. F. & J., 73.

3 34 Beav., 5o6.

TIME ON SUITS IN EQUITY.

devisee under the will began proceedings against the
trustees to recover the land, upon the ground that it was
included, on a proper interpretation of the will, in the
residuary devise to the same trustees in trust for the
plaintiff. The objection that the plaintiff's claim was
barred by the statute was overruled, and the claim was
sustained upon the ground that "a trustee -who is in
possession of lands is so in behalf of his ceslui que trust,
and his making a mistake as to the persons who are really
his cestuis que truslent cannot affect the question." "The
Statute of Limitations," said Lord CAN*oRTH in Bullock

v. Downs,' "can have no operation in a case like the
present, where the residuary estate has been set apart and
appropriated on the trusts of the will, whatever those trusts
may be; as between trustee and cestui que trust the statute
does not apply."
In strict conformity to principle it has been held in
England, where the Statute of Limitations excepts "express trusts" from its operation, that resulting trusts are
also included in the exception. Thus, in the case of Salter
v. Cavanagh,2 a testator devised certain lands to a trustee
for a term of years upon trusts which did not exhaust the
entire income of the property. Forty-seven years later the
testator's heirs-at-law were held to be entitled to the surplus
rents during the remainder of the term upon an express
trust arising from the legal interpretation of the will. And
in Brown v.Radford' a bill to enforce a resulting trust
arising from the conveyance of trust property without consideration was upheld by Sir GEORGE JESSEL after the lapse

of one hundred and four years.4
16 H. of 14., x.

xD. & W., 668.
3 W. N., 1874, 124.

4 See the leading American case of Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch.,
go. This decision of Chancellor KENT's is peculiarly instructive, for as
to some of the property in dispute he found that the holding had been
adverse and applied the statute, while as to "share 4I," he found that an
express trust existed, and refused to apply the statute. He recognizes the
distinction between actual, or express, and constructive trusts, when he
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In cases of constructive trust the possession of the
defendant is necessarily adverse, and in all such cases the
statutory bar will be applied. Thus, in Hovenden v. Lord
Annesley,' which was the case of a constructive trust arising
out of fraud, the lapse of sixty years was held to be a bar.
Moth v. Atwood' was a bill to set aside the conveyance of
says that the statute may be applied to the latter by analogy to the rule
of law, since over them the courts of law and equity have concurrent
jurisdiction; but that it will not apply to the former-the technical and
continuing trusts which fall within the peculiar province of a court of
equity. This mode of statement has been generally approved: Finney v.
Cochran, I W. & S., 112; Zacharias v. Zacharias, 23 Pa., 452; Heckert's
Appeal, 24 Pa., 482; Barton v. Dickens, 48 Pa., 518.
For instances of "express trusts," to which the statute will not be
applied, see Patrick v. Simpson, L. R., 24 Q. B. D., I28,; Nugent v. Nugent,
L. R., i5 Ir., 321; Banner V. Berridge, L. R., 18 Ch. D.,.262; Burdick v.
Garrick, L. R., 5 Ch.. App., 233; Lewis v. Hawkins, 23 Wal., 126; In re
Estate of Potter & Page, 58 Pa., 465; Cox v. Dolman, 2 De G., M. & G.,
592; Att'y.-Gen. v. Brewer's Co., Mer., 495; Ward v. Arch, 12 Sim., 475;
E 'pare Hasell; 3 V. & C., 617.
Simmons v. Rudall, i Sim. (N. S.), is, like Kane v. Bloodgood, is a
most instructive case, on account of the different rulings in respect of the
distinct pieces of property involved. The decision there was that threequarters of the propery in dispute was held by the defendants adversely
to the'plaintiff; that his remedy as heir-at-law was in ejectment; and that
his claim was barred by the lapse of twenty-eight years. As to the
remaining one-quarter of the property, itwas declared that there had been
an intestacy; that the defendants were, consequently, presumed to hold
as trustees for the heir, and, as to this part of the property, the lapse of
time was admitted to be 'o bar. In Attorney-General v. Fishmongers'
Company, 5 M. & Cr., I6, an attempt was made, after the lapse of four
hundred years, to impeach the title of the defendants to certain tenements in London, and to show that the same was held by the defendants
as trustees. Lord COTTZNEAm held that the lapse of time would be no
bar if it were clear that the will under which the company claimed had
created a trust. As the plaintiff relied upon matters extrinsic to the will,
and as it was doubtful whether the company was not intended to take
the whole beneficial title, the lapse of four hundred years was held to be
a bar.
1 2 S. & L., 636.
2 5 Vesey, Jr., 681. For other cases of constructive trusts see-Champion v. Rigby, I R. & M., 53; Roberts v. Tunstall, 4 Hare, 257; Ashburst's Appeal, 6o Pa., 290. In this last case Mr. Justice STRONG said:
"' Certain it is that no express trust is .either charged or proved."
Other
cases of adverse possession are Cholmondely v. Clinton, 2 J. & W. 14r;
hlthendorf v. Taylor, io Wheat., 152; Townshend v. Townshend, i Cox,
28; Bowman v. Wathen, i How., 189; Hamilton v'. Hamilton, 18 Pa., 20.
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a reversion on the ground of inadequacy of consideration
As this was a constructive trust (although, in point of fact,
the Court was of- opinion that the transaction was characterized by good faith), the lapse of the statutory period was
held to bar the plaintiff's right by analogy to the rule of
law.
II. The defense 6f acquiescence is available only in
those cases in which the cestui que trust is proved by the
defendant to have been fully cognizant of the facts of the
-case, and to have been aware of his legal right to dispute
the dealings in which he is alleged to have acquiesced. 1
"Length of time, where it does not operate as a statutory
-or positive bar," says Lord Justice TURNER in Life Association v. Siddal, 2 "operates, as I apprehend, simply as
evidence of assent or acquiescence. The two propositions
of a bar by length of time and by acquiscence are not, as
I conceive, distinct propositions. They constitute but one
proposition, and that proposition, when applied to a question of this description, is that the cestui que trust assented
to the breach of trust."
The question whether or not a plaintiff has acquiesced
is a delicate one for the chancellor to determine. No more
definite rule can be laid down than the general statement
that the burden. rests upon the defendant to prove that the
plaintiff was fully apprised of every fact and circumstance
which might reasonably have influenced him to assert his
rights. A typical case is Farrant v. Blanchford,3 where, in
spite of the fact that acquiescence was not an inference
from conduct but was evidenced by a written release, Sir
JOHN ROMIILLY held that the defendant had not discharged
the burden of proof that rested upon him, and refused to.
bar the plaintiff's suit. On appeal this decision was
reversed,' and the two views of the same case taken by the
'Cockerel
Hare, 16.

v.Cholmondely, i R. & M, 425; Marker v. Marker, 9

2 De G. F. &J., 73.
3 1 W. R-, 178.

-

4 I De G.J. & S., io.
In delivering his opinion, Sir JOHN ILOmiLLY
said: "This is a case in which, in my opinion, the plaintiff is entitled to a
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learned judges make the decision both interesting and
important
III. Lord ERSKmS statement of the ground upon
which the Court proceeds in cases of presumption has already
been quoted.' It is to be noted, in the first place, that a
presumption-that is to say, an assumption-will never be
raised except for the purpose of quieting a possession which
is adverse to the plaintiff, and that, accordingly, the doctrine of presumption seems to have no place as between
the parties to an express trust. After a lapse of time, it is.
a rule of property, founded upon considerations of policy,
that a presumption will arise that a legacy has been paid,
that a debt has been satisfied, or that a release has been
executed. But 'where the defendant admits his trusteeship
qua the property which is' actually in his hands, the prerequisites of a presumption are not present; there can be
no presumption of payment or satisfaction, for the trustee
holds the property; and there can be no presumption of a
decree. In the first place, there was originally a clear breach of trust by
Mr. Bidwell, the trustee, under which he would be liable to make good the
amount of the trust money unless something has been done by the plaintiff
to intercept his right to that equity. Now, I have to consider hoche could
intercept his right to that equity. It'must be either by reason of lapse of
time-that is to say somethingthat he has not done-or byreason of somethingthat he has done, or by the combined effect of the two. I will consider them separately. As to thelapse oftime, that alone would be no bar
in this case. The plaintiffwa 21 in March, x85; the bill wasfiled, I think,
in April, 186x ; and if that were unexplained, and it were a mere breach
of trust, though he knew of it at the time, that would not bar his right
to come here to have the breach of trust set right." Then he proceeds.
to examine a release of liability executed by the plaintiff to the defendant, and finds that it is without effect as being voluntary and without
consideration. He proceeds: "If it were an instrument under seal, and
if Mr. Bidwell relied upon it under those circumstances, it would be necessary for him to show that the father, or somebody on his behalf, duly
explained to the son the circumstances of the case, and that he had full
information upon the subject of what the value was of the proposed securities, and that all those circumstances were truly and fully explained to
the plaintiff before he signed the document." On appeal the decisioo
was reversed, not because the learned judge below had misstated the law,
but on the ground that sufficient knowledge of the facts and of his rightshad been brought home to the plaintiff at the time he signed the release.
1Sltfira, p. 322.
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xelease, for the defendant admits that he holds only the
legal title. Again, where a presumption might exist, and
.although it is said that presumptions are favored in law
.and should not be rebutted by slight evidence, it must be
remembered that the presumption is only a presumption.
It is inconceivable, for example, that if a creditor were, in
the absence of a Statute of Limitations, to bring suit after
a lapse of twenty years, any presumption of payment
-would arise where by the terms of the evidence of indebted-.
ness sued upon it was provided that payment should be
-made only upon a surrender of the document.
IV. In discussing the question of laches it is particularly important to bear in mind the principle so often
insisted upon, that mere lapse of time is no bar to the
a;ssertion of a pure equitable right. If the statute is inapplicable, if no presumptions exist, or if they have been
tebutted, and if the plaintiff is not seeking to impeach a
transaction, but -merely to enforce an express trust-so
that there. can be no question of acquiescence-then he
-will not be barred by lapse of time unless, as the result
of his delay, (i) the position of the defendant or of an
innocent third person has become irreparably altered for
the worse'; or (2), it has become impossible to do complete
justice between all the parties by reason of the death of
witnesses, the destruction of documents, or the loss of
evidence. -Under the former head it is interesting to note
the language of the Master of the Rolls in Wollaston v.
Tribe:' "Great stress was laid on the lapse of time, but I
think nothing of that, because all the persons interested
are in the same state now as they were then. If there had
:been any dealing which had altered the state of matters,
that might have raised a question, but there is nothing of
the sort." "The delay of the complainant in seeking
redress constitutes no defense," so said the Court in Daggers v. Van Dyck.' "It is only when the complainant has
slept over his wrongs so long that if relief be given to him

1L. R.,
237

9 Eq., 44.

N.J. Eq., 130.
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great wrong will be done to the defendant, that lades constitutes a complete defense."
It follows that in the case of a constructive trust-the
defense of laches is peculiarly available for the defendant.'
In such a case the possession of the defendant is-necessarily
adverse, and almost invariably a delay on the part of the
plaintiff will result in the defendant's altering his position
for the worse. Besides this, there are those considerations
which belong more properly under the second head of
laches-loss of evidence, etc.-for in the case of a constructive trust the trust is raised by matter dehors the written
instrument and independently of the defendant's own
admission, and the proof is always more or less complicated.

Under the second head of laches, Cranmer v. Mc Swordsz
is an important case. The Court there states the important
elements of laches to be the death of parties, the intervention of innocent third parties, such a loss of evidence as to
render it difficult to do justice, and the fact that evidence
consisted of parol testimony doubtful by reason of age.
The Court called attention to the fact that when these elements exist, relief is often denied within a period of twenty
years, and that when they have not existed, relief has often
been granted after a period much longer than twenty years.
Accordingly, in the United States v. City of Alexandria,after a delay of forty years, a bill for the conveyance of
stock -was sustained on the ground that in such a case, as
there had been no substantial change -of circumstances,
equity would enforce a claim of long standing as readily as
one of recent origin. It will be recollected that a portion
of the decision in Pickering v. Lord Stamford is referable
to this head; .and side by side with it may be placed the
case of Thorndike v. Loring,' where a resulting trust in
favor of the next of kin was enforced after the lapse of
'Ashhurst's Appeal, 6o Pa., 315; Evans'. Appeal, 81 Pa.,, 278.
224 W. Va., 6Ol.
319 Fed. Rep., 6og.
4 15 Gray, 391.
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twenty-eight years, as the rights of the plaintiff rested
exclusively upon the interpretation of a written instrument
and the very fund which he claimed subsisted intact in
the hands of the trustees.
Upon the whole, therefore, it is contended that LEWIN
is wrong, and that Lord ALVANL.EY is right in his assertion

that no rule has established that mere length of time will
bar a suit in equity. If a case is not capable of being reduced to one of the four categories developed above,-tl'e
mere circumstance that the claim is of long standing will
not deprive the plaintiff of his relief. A thousand years
in the sight of the Chancellor are but as yesterday.
PmIADBrPiA, March, 1893.

